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On February 12th, the criminal trial against twelve Catalan independence leaders has
started before the Spanish Supreme Court. It is surely the most important trial in the
history of Spanish democracy for its political implications.
As we all know, criminal justice in a democratic rule of law system should remain
independent from any political influence or pressure. And it should never be used as
a political instrument, as a replacement or a substitute of democratic politics. Thus,
there should be a thick and clear line separating politics from criminal law. However,
several concerns have emerged in the last months and weeks regarding this trial
making us fear that the clear and thick line between politics and criminal law might
blur or haze in both directions.
First of all, some doubts about the scrupulous impartiality of the court have
legitimately been raised. To some pre-existing doubts about the competence of
the Supreme Court and some alleged irregularities in the process of establishing
its jurisdiction, we need to add the unfortunate event of last November 2018, when
a Spanish Senator from Partido Popular (the right-wing Spanish party) affirmed
in a private message to the other senators of his political group that his party was
going to “control the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court from behind”. Even if
a hearing with this Senator as a witness has not been admitted by the Court, the
former Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy will testify in the trial, probably next
week, in addition to a long list of Spanish and Catalan political leaders.
Secondly, the basic truth is that several leaders of the Catalan independence
movement are being tried. Their political parties are announcing massive
mobilizations and protests against the trial. For Thursday 21st a general
strike has been called in Catalonia to protest against the trial. It has not been
massively followed, but it has been only the first of many other mobilizations and
demonstrations that are bound to be announced. On the other hand, last Sunday the
three right-wing parties, PP, Ciudadanos and Vox, called for another demonstration
in Madrid against the independentist aspiration and asking for a long sentence
for the leaders being tried. In fact, one of these parties, the far-right, proto-fascist,
emerging political party Vox, is taking part in the trial as private popular prosecutor.
Add to this that all these parties find themselves in an open pre-electoral contest
in view of the upcoming national (April 28th) and European, regional, and local
elections (May 26th). All this does definitely not create an atmosphere of isolation
and neutrality that an important trial like this would require and deserve.
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Before returning to the demarcation between politics and criminal law, however, let
me summarize the basic facts of this trial.
Who is accused?
Twelve independentist leaders, nine of which former ministers of the Catalan
Government (including the former Vice-President and leader of the left-wing
independentist party ERC, Oriol Junqueras; and eight other former ministers from
both independentist parties, ERC and the right-wing one, PDeCAT); the former
President of the Catalan Parliament (Carme Forcadell, also from ERC), and the two
leaders of the two biggest independentist social organizations: Òmnium Cultural
(Jordi Cuixart) and the ANC (Jordi Sánchez).
Who is in robes?
The Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court is presided by Justice Manuel
Marchena, and is composed of six other Justices, including only one woman (Justice
Ana Ferrer), with a clear majority of conservative ideology (only two of the seven
Justices are regarded as progressive). Regarding the defenses, there are nine
defense lawyers leading nine different teams representing the twelve defendants.
Finally, there are three prosecuting parts: the public Prosecutorial Attorney of the
Supreme Court; the State Lawyer, representing the Spanish State’s Government;
and a private popular prosecutor, representing the far-right party Vox.
What are the charges and possible sentences?
The criminal charges are four, even if not all twelve defendants are charged with
the same ones: rebellion, sedition, disobedience to authorities, and misuse or
embezzlement of public funds. Vice-President Junqueras, for instance, has so far
been charged with rebellion and misuse of public funds, but this might still change
during the process, and the public Attorney is initially asking for a sentence of 25
years in prison. For most of the other 11 defendants, the sentence petition ranges
from 7 to 17 years.
At this point, it is necessary to introduce some critical analysis. As expressed in a
petition signed last year by more than 400 criminal law professors, most of which are
not even Catalan, let alone independentists, the charges of rebellion and sedition are
highly implausible, from a technical, criminal legal point of view.
First of all, according to Article 472 of the Spanish Criminal Code, the offense of
rebellion requires as one of the objective elements in the actus reus a “violent
and public uprising”. We all know enough about the relevant facts of 2017 to be
certain that there was no violence on the side of the independence movement,
besides the low-level confrontation that can arise in any social protest. If anything
has characterized the Catalan secessionist movement and its leaders, besides their
irresponsibility, it has been their commitment to a pacifist and non-violent ideology,
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even if accompanied by massive and impressive social protests and mobilizations.
The charge of rebellion, therefore, lacks any plausibility.
Regarding sedition, Article 544 of the Spanish Criminal Code requires a “public
and tumultuous uprising to prevent, by force or by illegal means, the enforcement
of Spanish law or the normal exercise of public authorities”, as long as it does
not constitute a crime of rebellion. What exactly is a “tumultuous”, but not-violent
uprising? Do the events of September 20th qualify as such, as alleged by the
prosecutor, when a crowd surrounded the building of the Catalan Ministry of
Economy to protest and prevent a court official to do a search in the building?
The Supreme Court could interpret the notion of “tumultuous uprising” in a more
extensive or a more restrictive way. But we need to remember that by virtue of
the principle of in dubio pro reo,  if the interpretation is not obvious, judges should
always interpret the law in favor of the defendants’ view. Moreover, the facts of
September 20th are not different from, and not even as serious as, for instance what
took place on June 15th 2011; then, 2,000 “indignados” surrounded the Catalan
Parliament trying to prevent the MPs to get into the chamber. And yes, it is true that
some of the protesters back then were indicted and sentenced to three years for
their actions. But it is also true that they were not charged with sedition, but just with
the minor crime of coercing the authorities.
Things look different regarding the charge of disobedience to authorities. The
Constitutional Court had explicitly pointed out to the independentists’ political leaders
that they were not allowed to collaborate, by action or omission, with the organization
of the referendum of October 1st. Even if they deny they had anything to do with the
organization of such referendum, it is clear that they did not do anything to stop it,
when they could have done it. Finally, regarding the embezzlement or misuse of
public funds, the prosecutors hold that they have found the company that printed out
the ballot boxes for the referendum, but whether they will be able to prove that this
company was paid with public money is far from clear. In any case, these two last
charges are the most plausible ones in this trial.
What are the main pieces of evidence?
Apart from some pieces of documentary evidence, like e-mails and files, or reports
about damages produced during some of the protests, most of the pieces of
evidence that were initially proposed by the parties in the trial are witnesses. The
prosecutors proposed 311 witnesses, while the defenses proposed 289. The Court
has accepted a total of 558 witnesses, which is the main reason to expect a long
trial. Rejected witnesses include Spain’s King, Philip VI and the former Catalan
President Carles Puigdemont, who is escaping from Spanish justice and currently
living in Waterloo. Among those admitted, there is former Spanish Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy and many other political leaders. In any case, and with the exception
of the eventual crime of misuse of public funds, the main issue at stake in this
trial is not a factual one. Everyone knows pretty well about the relevant facts, and
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controversy exists more about how to qualify them from a criminal legal point of view,
rather than about what really happened.
Political or technical defense strategies?
After the first two weeks of the trial, different defense strategies and styles have
become visible. Contrary to the description given by part of the Spanish, such
differences do not lie in the fact that some of these strategies are “political”, while
others are rather “technical”. All these defense strategies are technical, and all of
them are also, inevitably, political, as all defendants have declared that this is a
“political” trial and they feel like “political” prisoners.
The main difference I see among the defenses is this. While some of them
restrict themselves to deny the facts alleged by the accusation, in particular the
presence of any form of violence, simply seeking a declaration of not-guilty, the
strategy of others goes beyond that and, having in mind potential appeals to the
Constitutional Court and to the European Court of Human Rights, denounces a
political prosecution based on the use against them of the doctrine of the “Criminal
Law of the Enemy” (Feindstrafrecht), as described by Günther Jakobs. This defense
strategy, followed by the lawyers of Junqueras and Romeva, has raised concerns
about whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case, qualifying the
situation as a “procedural vaudeville”, and it has argued that several defendants’
fundamental rights have been violated.
There are, in fact, reasons to believe that some of the defendants’ fundamental
rights might have been unduly restricted. Leaving aside the jurisdictional discussion
and their right to due process, there are serious concerns about the justifiability of
the pre-trial detention the defendants have suffered for more than one year now.
As many legal analysts in Spain have pointed out, none of the three conditions that
justify such kind of detention seem to apply to this case. Also, the political rights of
those defendants who are members of the Catalan Parliament seem to have been
violated, since they were not allowed to exercise their Parliamentary duties while
in pre-trial detention. This happened even before they were formally charged with
rebellion, which, according to the Spanish criminal procedural law, is one of the
conditions for the suspension of public office.
Politics and criminal law
Let me now get back to my initial reflections about the thick line between politics and
criminal law. I started this post by affirming that this is the most important criminal
trial in the history of Spanish democracy, and democracy itself and the rule of law
might be at stake.
We are in the middle of a gigantic and deep political conflict in Spain, one that only
democratic politics can properly handle. And no criminal trial, whatever its result,
is going to fix or make it vanish. Criminalizing social protest, or violating or unduly
- 4 -
restricting the civil and political rights of the defendants, is clearly not the way to
make things better.
In several posts I previously published on this blog (here, here, here and here), I
have described the escalation of the political conflict in Catalonia in the last two
years. I qualified several events that occurred in September 2017 as a “constitutional
coup d’état”, in Kelsenian, technical terms, that clearly violated the Spanish
constitution by trying to create a parallel and independent legal order. As I argued,
the so-called referendum of October 1st was clearly unconstitutional and illegal in my
view. And even if police brutality trying to prevent Catalan voters from casting their
vote in such referendum was disproportional and therefore also illegal – and many
of us protested along the independentists on October the 3rd for that unjustified and
undemocratic reaction –, President Puigdemont had no democratic legitimacy, and
certainly no legal basis, to declare independence on October 27th. But none of this
implies that the defendants are guilty of any crime. To be clear: they deserve a fair
trial, with all due guarantees, of course, and if they are found to be responsible for
some crime, they must surely be sentenced. The rule of law must be scrupulously
respected. However, even if that is the result of the trial, the political conflict will
surely remain. Criminal law alone is not the way to go. Only democracy, we all know
that, can do something to deal effectively and legitimately with such conflict.
The author has given technical advice to some of the defenses in the trial.
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